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Preliminary remarks on the method
The economic effects presented here are based on simula-
tion calculations that estimate how international trade 
flows would change in the event of a comprehensive free-
trade agreement between the US and the EU, a Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The 
starting point is the consideration that the abolishment of 
customs duties and non-tariff barriers to trade between 
the contracting parties would reduce the costs of bilateral 
trade for the participating economies. In this way, a TTIP 
would intensify foreign trade between the US and the 27 
EU member states (trade creation). Reduced trade costs 
between the countries involved in the free-trade agree-
ment would, however, also cause a reduction in trade ac-
tivities between the contracting economies and the rest of 
the world (trade diversion).
 In the simulation calculations two main scenarios are 
considered. In the first scenario (tariff scenario) the eco-
nomic consequences of the total abolition of import duties 
between the EU and the US are examined. In the second 
scenario (liberalization scenario), non-tariff barriers to 
trade are abolished along with customs duties. Both sce-
Negotiations between the US and the European Union (EU) on a joint free-
trade agreement began in July 2013. The economies involved are hoping for 
more intense trade activities, stronger economic growth and higher employ-
ment rates. A current study of the ifo Institut commissioned by the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung shows that these expectations would be met. For most other coun-
tries in the world, however, this would result in welfare loss. In the following 
we sketch some of the possible economic consequences of a comprehensive 
transatlantic free-trade agreement for the Asian region.
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 Increase in foreign trade between the US and the 27 
individual EU member states would also increase produc-
tion and employment. One important indicator for mea-
suring the economic benefits in this context is real gross 
domestic product per capita. Figure 1 provides an over-
view of the winners and losers of a comprehensive trans-
atlantic free-trade agreement: While the US and EU mem-
ber states would profit from this, other countries would 
suffer the effects of trade diversion. This would hit Canada 
narios are compared with a situation where there is no 
transatlantic free-trade agreement. The effects resulting 
from the removal of barriers to trade are calculated using 
a model for the analysis of free-trade agreements devel-
oped by the ifo Institut. This model uses existing free-
trade agreements to evaluate the resultant effects on ex-
port and import flows. These empirically estimated values 
for trade effects are then integrated into a simulation 
model that calculates the trade creating and trade divert-
ing effects of a transatlantic free-trade agreement for 126 
economies under consideration. Necessary adjustment 
processes are not explicitly treated. Thus the consequenc-
es sketched in the following are long-term effects, i.e. ef-
fects that will only unfold their full consequences 10 to 20 
years after the agreement comes into force (cf. for a de-
tailed description, Felbermayr et al 2013). The macroeco-
nomic effects sketched below therefore must be interpret-
ed as indicating the amount the respective economic 
values would have had in 2010 had the US and the EU 
entered into a comprehensive free-trade agreement 20 
years ago and had this agreement unfolded its full effect 
by 2010 at the latest.
 Since import duties between the EU and the US have 
already reached a very low level, the economic effects 
would be marginal if import duties alone were abolished. 
Thus only the economic effects that would result in the 
event of a comprehensive free-trade agreement between 
the EU and the US are sketched below (liberalization sce-
nario).
Global welfare effects of a 
comprehensive free-trade agreement
Removal of barriers to trade between the EU and the US 
would increase trade activities between the two regions. 
Intensification of these trade relationships would, howev-
er, be offset by a reduction of trading activities within the 
EU and a reduction of foreign trade relationships with 
most third countries.
Figure 1: The top 25 winners 
and losers of a comprehensive 
free-trade agreement
Changes to the long-term real gross domestic product per capita
Indication in percent
United States + 13.4 Lebanon – 3.4
Great Britain + 9.7 Algeria – 3.5
Sweden + 7.3 Switzerland – 3.8
Ireland + 6.9 New Zealand – 3.8
Spain + 6.6 Norway – 3.9
Finland + 6.2 Iceland – 3.9
Malta + 6.2 Niger – 4.0
Estonia + 5.7 Malawi – 4.0
Latvia + 5.4 Botswana – 4.1
Denmark + 5.3 Panama – 4.2
Greece + 5.1 El Salvador – 4.4
Lithuania + 5.1 Guatemala – 4.4
Cyprus + 5.0 Honduras – 4.4
Portugal + 5.0 Barbados – 4.5
Italy + 4.9 Jamaica – 4.7
Bulgaria + 4.8 St. Lucia – 4.8
Germany + 4.7 Costa Rica – 5.5
Romania + 4.6 Israel – 5.5
Hungary + 4.4 Jordan – 5.5
The Netherlands + 4.4 Chile – 5.6
Slovakia + 4.2 Japan – 5.9
Poland + 3.7 Belize – 6.0
Belgium + 3.6 Mexico – 7.2
Slovenia + 3.3 Australia – 7.4
Luxembourg + 3.0 Canada – 9.5
Source: ifo Institut
3ties in the world would decline. Figure 2 shows the stron-
gest export loss in percent among selected Asian econo-
mies.1 The largest reductions in percent would be for 
exports to the US and Great Britain. In absolute terms, 
China would suffer the strongest reduction in exports, if 
there was now a fully functional transatlantic free-trade 
agreement already in place, Chinese exports to the US 
would drop from their current level of around US$ 327.5 to 
US$ 218 billion. However, such a reduction of trading ac-
tivities would also affect Asian imports from the US and 
the EU. For example, US imports into China, Indonesia, 
Thailand and South Korea would be cut by one third. 
 Reduction of the trade relationships between Asia on 
the one hand and the US or individual EU member states 
and Mexico particularly hard, both of which currently 
maintain a free-trade agreement with the US that would 
be devaluated by ratification of a transatlantic free-trade 
agreement. European states that are not part of the EU 
would also suffer real income loss. Threshold countries 
would be another big loser. As a whole, however, the world 
would profit from a comprehensive transatlantic free-
trade agreement: Average real per-capita income would 
increase by nearly 3.3 percent.
Trade Effects on Asia
If the US imported more goods and services from EU 
member states and EU-states increased their imports 
from the US as well, demand for imports from other coun-
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 2: The biggest loss of exports in percent among 
selected Asian economies resulting from a comprehensive 
transatlantic free-trade agreement
Exporter Importer
Export volume 2010 
(in M. US-Dollar)
Change 
of exports (in %)
Japan United States 117,876,109 – 20.1
China Ireland 2,951,793 – 20.2
South Korea Finland 629,350 – 20.7
China Sweden 6,021,559 – 20.9
Thailand Ireland 320,451 – 21.1
South Korea Spain 2,156,943 – 21.7
Thailand Sweden 587,248 – 21.9
South Korea Ireland 429,296 – 23.0
South Korea Sweden 2,067,784 – 23.8
India Great Britain 8,257,631 – 24.7
China Great Britain 48,619,164 – 27.6
Indonesia Great Britain 2,284,965 – 28.4
Thailand Great Britain 3,678,968 – 28.4
South Korea Great Britain 4,013,072 – 30.2
India United States 29,213,796 – 30.8
China United States 327,554,013 – 33.4
Indonesia United States 17,316,834 – 34.2
Thailand United States 22,627,135 – 34.2
South Korea United States 49,766,160 – 35.8
1 The study comprises 15 Asian countries: Bangladesh, Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
 Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
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tion in the prices of US imports following a transatlantic 
free-trade agreement.
Welfare effects on Asia
One common indicator to measure welfare effects is the 
above cited real gross domestic product per capita. Fi-
nalization of a free-trade agreement would act on this 
indicator via two central channels: on the one hand by 
changes to international trade flows, and on the other 
via the price-reducing effect of a free-trade agreement. 
In terms of trade flows, an increase of domestic exports 
on the other would be partially compensated by more in-
tensive trade activities between the Asian economies. 
This development is illustrated for selected countries in 
Figure 3.
 While most Asian economies would reduce their ex-
ports to the US and EU-states in the wake of a transatlan-
tic free-trade agreement, Japan would raise its exports to 
a number of EU-states (see Figure 4). This is mainly be-
cause the Japanese economy offers many products (such 
as cars and electronic goods) that European consumers 
value and that would still be in demand in spite of a reduc-
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 3: Changes in exports following a comprehensive free-trade 
agreement for selected Asian economies (data as percent)
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5 At the end of the day which of these effective channels 
would be more important in the countries under observa-
tion cannot be derived from purely theoretical consider-
ations, but can only be ascertained once the simulation 
computations are performed. Figure 5 shows that a com-
prehensive transatlantic free-trade agreement would re-
sult in the reduction of the real gross domestic product of 
all the 15 Asian economies under consideration here with 
the exception of South Korea where the welfare-increas-
ing effect resulting from the import of cheaper products 
from the US and the EU would be predominant.
on its own would increase production and employment 
in the exporting country which in turn would tend to 
favor an increase in the real gross domestic product. Yet 
on the other hand an increase in imports would displace 
domestic products which would tend to reduce produc-
tion and the real gross domestic product in the import-
ing country. Finally, the removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade would reduce the prices of internation-
ally traded products. The general reduction of the price 
level this would entail would increase the real gross do-
mestic product.
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 4: Changes in Japanese exports to selected countries following a comprehensive 
transatlantic free-trade agreement (data as percent)
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cluding most of the Asian economies. A TTIP should strive 
to avoid such negative effects or at least keep them to a 
bare minimum. In particular, traditional trading partners 
of the two major economies should be included in the ne-
gotiations or be given an early opportunity to enter into 
similar agreements with them if this has not yet already 
been done. At the same time, the real welfare gains of 
Western industrial states should be incentive enough for 
them to give the losers of the agreement adequate com-
Results and consequences 
on economic policy
Intensified trade between the US and the EU would have 
positive income and employment effects on the econo-
mies involved. This applies in particular in the case of a 
comprehensive agreement that eliminates non-tariff bar-
riers to trade along with customs duties. Welfare gains in 
the US and the EU would, however, be partially countered 
by considerable loss of real income in third countries, in-
Source: ifo Institut
Figure 5: Changes of the real gross domestic product per capita 
following a comprehensive transatlantic free-trade agreement
PACIFIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
Change in real gross domestic product per capita (%): 
 0 to + 1,   0 to – 1,   – 1 to – 2,   – 2 to – 3,   from – 3
Indonesia  |  – 0.21 ¶
Malaysia  |  – 0.28 ¶
India  | – 1.67 ¶
China  |  – 0.39¶
Japan  |  – 5.90¶
Papua New Guinea  |  – 1.34¶
Thailand  |  – 0.17¶
Pakistan  |  – 1.39¶
Philippines  |  – 2.24¶
Singapore  |  – 1.68 ¶
Brunei Darussalam  |  – 0.35¶
Sri Lanka  |  – 0.76 ¶
South Korea  |  + 0.74
¶
Bangladesh  |  – 0.42¶
Nepal  |  – 0.57¶
7pensation and to show a willingness to compromise in 
multilateral negotiations.
 Moreover, the economies of Asia – and South America 
and Africa as well – could also try to generate further 
growth impulses by entering into even stronger economic 
cooperation with regional partner countries. At the sum-
mit meeting of the 21 countries of the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) held in Bali in early October, 
the Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that his coun-
try wanted to “found a transpacific structure of coopera-
tion” that would benefit all.2 The ASEAN states (Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations) and China have already 
ratified a free-trade agreement that entered into effect on 
1 January 2010. In November 2012, the ASEAN states also 
agreed to negotiate a common free-trade agreement with 
six partner countries with which they already have bilat-
eral free-trade agreements (Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand and South Korea). This agreement would 
span the Asian-Pacific region and constitute the world’s 
largest free-trade area covering some 3.4 billion people 
and with an almost 30 percent share of total global trade 
(cf. Hoepfner 2013). Latin America already has a multilat-
eral free-trade agreement called Mercosur (short for “Mer-
cado Común del Sur”, or Common Market of the South).
 Generally speaking, one of the possible effects of a 
transatlantic free-trade agreement is that it could lead 
other economies to seek stronger regional economic inte-
gration. Furthermore, a TTIP could also serve to boost and 
not brake the faltering Doha Development Round of multi-
lateral negotiations.
2 Christoph Hein, China will Führung im Pazifikraum übernehmen, F.A.Z. 07.10.2013, 
 www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/weltwirtschaft-china-will-fuehrung-im-pazifikraum-uebernehmen-12607892.html.
Further reading:
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.). Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Who benefi ts from a 
free trade deal? Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.). Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Who benefi ts 
from a free trade deal? Part 1: Macroeconomic Effects, 
Gütersloh 2013.
Felbermayr, Gabriel et al. Dimensionen und Aus-
wirkungen eines Freihandelsabkommens zwischen 
der EU und den USA, Studie im Auftrag des Bundes-
ministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie, End-
bericht, München 2013.
Hoepfner, Maren. ASEAN+6: Größte Freihandels-
zone der Welt in Planung, GIGA Focus Asien, Nr. 4, 
Hamburg 2013.
www.ged-project.de/shorts/short/who-benefi ts-
from-a-transatlantic-free-trade-deal/.
8November 2013    Asia Policy Brief    2013 | 05
V.i.S.d.P.
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
D-33311 Gütersloh
Stephan Vopel
stephan.vopel@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Dr. Peter Walkenhorst
peter.walkenhorst@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
If you have any questions or if you wish to subscribe 
to the “Asia Policy Brief” please write to 
asien@bertelsmann-stiftung.de.
All “Asia Policy Brief” editions can be downloaded 
from www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/asien.
ISSN 2195-0485
Latest editions:
Asia Policy Brief 2013 | 04
Between nuclear armament and economic 
pragmatism: Is North Korea Facing Change? 
Rüdiger Frank
Asia Policy Brief 2013 | 03
Japan und China: 
Bitter Rivals and Close Partners 
Axel Berkofsky
Asia Policy Brief 2013 | 02
China's New Government: 
Priorities, Programs, Reform Signals
Sebastian Heilmann
Asia Policy Brief 2013 | 01
Der Aufstieg Asiens aus Sicht der Deutschen. 
Ergebnisse einer Bevölkerungsumfrage im 
Auftrag der Bertelsmann Stiftung, Oktober 2012 
(German only)
Helmut Hauschild und Ye-One Rhie 
